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In September 1983, the United States Environ-mental Protection Agency (USEPA) initiated a ban on EDB (ethylene dibromide), a fumi-
gant widely used on fruit crops and stored grain, 
after discovering high levels in groundwater.1 At 
that time, EDB was also employed as an addi-
tive in leaded gasoline. EDB was known to cause 
cancer as well as birth defects in test animals. It is 
capable of chemically bonding with DNA as well 
as proteins. Since EDB has two bromine atoms, 
it can create DNA cross-links making mutations 
particularly difficult for cellular repair. Subse-
quently, California officials reported alarmingly 
high levels of EDB in fruits. Reports of high levels 
in muffin, corn flour, and cake mixes, as well as 
some imported fruits, started to appear. The EPA 
adopted guidelines on February 3, 1984 restrict-
ing maximum levels in ready-to-eat foods to 30 
parts per billion (ppb), 150 ppb in foods to be 
cooked, and 900 ppb in raw grain.1 
   The present essay revisits why and how decisions 
were made to remove EDB-contaminated foods 
from supermarket shelves during a month-long 
period of intensive concern. It is a process that 
had scientific, medical, political, and financial 
dimensions. Risks to public health as well as mil-
lions, possibly billions, of dollars rested on these 
decisions. Typically, the average citizen only learns 
of final decisions in such cases, the processes lead-
ing to them being both complex and mysterious. 
In the EDB case study summarized very briefly 
in this essay, the most reassuring aspects were the 
“conservative” (i.e., human-protective) approach 
and the collaboration between industry, govern-
ment, and academe that led to action based upon 
complex, albeit uncertain, science. The author 
had the good fortune to be a member of the state 
panel that made recommendations enacted by the 
state of New Jersey.
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A Brief Primer on Human Exposure to Toxic 
Substances
   Carbon monoxide is a toxic substance2 that 
produces acute (short-lived) effects.3 While acute 
exposure to levels of 150-200 parts per million 
(ppm) or higher may well result in death, expo-
sure to levels around 70 ppm causes nausea and/or 
vomiting. Fresh air restores normal health. In con-
trast, chronic exposure to exceedingly low levels 
(ppb, ppt, or lower) of carcinogens may result in 
irreversible development of cancer. What is a ppb 
(part per billion)? Imagine a single drop of EDB 
in a municipal swimming pool. A ppt (part per 
trillion) is one thousand times even more dilute. 
Although humans have DNA-repair mechanisms, 
it is theorized that, in principle, cancer can be 
initiated by a single mutation. This is the basis 
for the USEPA classifying the MCL (Maximum 
Contaminant Level) of carcinogens such as EDB 
as zero. However, since chemical analysis is amaz-
ingly sensitive (not uncommonly 0.001 ppt), 
the USEPA issues practical standards for MCLG 
(Maximum Contaminant Level Goal). The 
MCLG for EDB is 0.05 ppb in drinking water.4
   Humans are exposed to toxic substances 
through inhalation, ingestion, and dermal absorp-
tion. Consider the example of the carcinogen 
trichloroethylene (TCE),5 an industrial degreaser 
used to clean metal prior to painting. Waste TCE 
may ultimately flow into sources of drinking 
water. How does one assess risk? First, measure-
ments using extremely sensitive chemical analyses 
are performed to survey a representative set of 
groundwater systems. Of 55 systems serving pop-
ulations in the U.S. greater than 100,000 people, 
it was determined that 41 had TCE levels lower 
than 0.5 ppb, 14 had TCE levels in the range 0.5 
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to 5 ppb, and none had levels exceeding 5 ppb.5 
At the other extreme (systems serving 25 to 100 
people), of 19,125 estimated systems, 18,506 were 
estimated to have levels less than 0.5 ppb, 465 
between 0.5 to 5 ppb, and 156 higher than 5 ppb 
including 26 greater than 100 ppb. 
   Next one considers human exposure to highly-
polluted water (100 ppb). This is a “conservative” 
(i.e., worst case, human-protective) approach. 
Exposure routes include ingestion of water, inhala-
tion of indoor air as well as shower air, and dermal 
absorption (bathing, swimming). Based upon 
fairly rough assumptions, total daily exposures 
to TCE are formula-fed 9 lb infant: 80 μg (mi-
crogram = millionth of a gram); 70-pound pre-
teen: 320-640 μg; 132-pound woman: 600 μg; 
154-pound man: 490 μg. Why the higher number 
for the woman?5 When these estimates were made 
(1980s), a considerably higher percentage of wom-
en compared to men, spent more time at home.
   Although estimates of source concentrations and 
especially human exposure scenarios have large 
uncertainties, the greatest uncertainty comes from 
extrapolation of animal testing to realistic human 
exposure scenarios. Animal studies of carcinogens 
are usually impractical using realistic exposures. 
Even a very potent carcinogen may produce one 
case of cancer in 1000 animals at realistic levels. 
To make animal carcinogenicity testing feasible, 
unrealistically high doses are administered. Ex-
trapolation of “megadose” data to environmen-
tally-realistic levels can easily account for an 
uncertainty factor of ten thousand or more. In the 
absence of more precise science, the “conservative” 
(people-protective) approach is a linear extrapo-
lation from the POD (point of departure): the 
estimated dose near the lower end of the observed 
range.6
  
How Were Decisions Made?
   New Jersey assembled an EDB Advisory Group 
consisting of 10 scientists and medical doctors 
and chaired by an assistant commissioner of the 
New Jersey Department of Health.7 The group 
included epidemiologists, toxicologists, chemists, 
biochemists, medical doctors, a medical ethicist, 
and scientists from the food industry. There was 
constant exchange of data and information with 
the USEPA, as well as with the health depart-
ments of large states including California, Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas. 
The goal of the Advisory Group was to make a 
recommendation to the New Jersey Department 
of Health about which foods must be immediately 
removed from market shelves and not sold (or 
donated) to the public.    
   The first analyses were conducted on baby foods. 
Happily, the results were negative at the limits of 
detection. A sample of Mexican oranges obtained 
in a New York City market was the “record hold-
er:” 41,590 ppb (peel); 2,173 ppb (pulp). A box 
of long-grain rice was found to have a level of 351 
ppb EDB and the batch was immediately recalled 
by the manufacturer. A survey of 23 commercial 
bread samples found that 20 had undetectable 
levels of EDB, with an overall average of 0.88 ppb 
(one sample had 7.4 ppb); seven ready-to-eat corn 
muffins had an average of 3.1 ppb, and 12 cold 
cereals all had levels lower than the limit of detec-
tion. 
  
   As these chemical analyses continued, the next 
step was estimation of total human exposure to 
EDB. To simplify the process, three classes of 
people were recognized (with estimated daily con-
sumption in parentheses): 1) General Population 
(grains: 270 grams; citrus crops: 74 grams); 2) 
Vegetarian Population (grains: 970 grams; citrus 
crops: 200 grams); and 3) Two-Year-Old Child 
(grains: 103 grams; citrus crops: 125 grams). Total 
ingestion of EDB was then estimated for various 
EDB concentrations from 1 ppb to 50 ppb. While 
removing contaminated foods from the shelves 
would effectively eliminate ingestion of EDB, 
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inhalation of EDB from ambient air was unavoid-
able (in 1984 EDB was still added to leaded gaso-
line). A survey of the literature indicated average 
concentrations of EDB in ambient air of 27 ppt. 
A two-year-old child inhales about 8 cubic meters 
(m3) of air per day; an adult inhales about 20 m3 
of air each day. The exposure comparison was very 
illuminating. If the limit adopted for ready-to-eat 
food was the USEPA recommended maximum at 
30 ppb,1 a two-year-old child would ingest 6.9 
μg of EDB per day and inhale 1.7 μg from aver-
age ambient air. If the food limit was designated 
at 5 ppb, daily ingestion would account for 1.1 μg 
while inhalation would still account for 1.7 μg. If 
the limit for ready-to-eat food was designated at 1 
ppb, daily ingestion would account for 0.2 μg and 
daily inhalation would account for1.7 μg—almost 
an order of magnitude greater. It must be pointed 
out that in 1984 little was known about the 
relative health hazards of ingested versus inhaled 
EDB.
   Analysis of lifetime (70-year) risks of cancer 
deaths due to exposures to EDB at various levels 
then followed. It is generally accepted that one in 
a million “excess deaths” over a lifetime due to a 
specific source is an acceptable benchmark since 
that is below the “background noise” of other 
lifetime risks such as automobile accidents and 
various health risks. Among many scenarios, the 
EDB Advisory Group made the following com-
parison of Excess Cancer Risk per million for the 
General Population for ready-to-eat foods (citrus 
and grains): At 1 ppb: Risk due to grains + cit-
rus: 6; Risk due to air: 80. At 5 ppb: Risk due to 
grains + citrus: 33; Risk due to air: 80; At 30 ppb: 
Risk due to grains + citrus: 190; Risk due to air: 
80. In the decision-making process, Massachusetts 
considered adopting guidelines of 1 ppb for both 
intermediate products (e.g., muffin mixes) as well 
as ready-to-eat foods. That would have resulted 
in the elimination from supermarket shelves of 
roughly 11 percent of ready-to-eat foods and 87 
percent of mixes. Ultimately, New Jersey settled 
on the USEPA guidelines, eliminating roughly 3 
percent of ready-to-eat products and 2 percent of 
intermediate products. 
The Aftermath 
   The use of EDB as a fumigant was banned in 
1984 and all traces disappeared from the food 
chain during the next two to three years. (The 70-
year lifetime exposure scenario noted above was 
also part of the human-protective decision-making 
strategy.) Leaded gasoline was totally eliminated 
from on-road vehicles by the USEPA as of January 
1996 and EDB was no longer a gasoline addi-
tive. Its lifetime in the environment is only on 
the order of months so it is no longer a problem. 
Ironically, EDB’s first replacement as a fumigant, 
methyl bromide (more volatile and less toxic), 
was found to be damaging to the ozone layer and 
banned by 2005. Fumigation remains an impor-
tant technique for producing and storing food at 
reasonable cost. Typically, modern fumigants such 
as arsine are volatile and short-lived in the envi-
ronment but their high toxicity requires great care 
by those who apply them to crops or stored grains.
   And what of the foods removed from super-
market shelves and the food supply during 1984? 
One could readily make the case that the EDB 
risks were far lower than risks due to malnutrition. 
Why not supply these food products to mal-
nourished populations? However, such a decision 
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